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This paper aims to critically analyse common-law remedy of piercing the corporate veil and 
the actio pauliana as distinct from statutory remedies provided for by the Companies Acts 61 
of 1973 and 71 of 2008 in the recovery of tax by the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”). 
This will be achieved through a comparison of the common law remedies of piercing the 
corporate veil and the actio pauliana with the statutory remedies which allow for piercing the 
corporate veil namely section 20 (9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 424 of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 in relation to a company being wound up as insolvent, section 64 
of the Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984 and the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 in relation 
to tax debts. With the aim of establishing that piercing the corporate veil at common law and 
statutory piercing of the corporate veil although closely related have evolved into two distinct 
remedies. This dissertation will also explore the differences between the actio pauliana and a 
statutory piercing of the corporate veil, with the aim of establishing whether these common law 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1. Introduction and Background  
The coming into effect of the Companies’ Act 71 of 20081 (hereinafter referred to as the new 
Companies Act) heralded the partial codification of the remedy of piercing the corporate veil 
in South Africa. The new Companies Act added on to the number of statutes which allow for 
the statutory disregarding of a company’s separate legal personality and for piercing the 
corporate veil2. Traditionally creditors relied on the common-law remedy of piercing the 
corporate veil, the doctrine of notice and the actio pauliana to attach personal liability to 
directors and shareholders who try to hide behind the corporate veil to escape personal liability 
in cases of fraudulent, dishonest and reckless trading.  
This research will be limited to a critical analysis of the actio pauliana and the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil as distinct from the remedies provided for by companies’ legislation. 
It will further explore whether these two common law remedies are still relevant to the South 
African Revenue Service3 (herein after referred to as “SARS”) in recovering taxes in light of 
the various statutory remedies available4.SARS is party to numerous litigation proceedings 
where taxpayers try to hide behind the corporate veil to avoid personal liability in situations 
where a company is used as a facade or in fraudulent and dishonest transactions in order to 
avoid tax obligations. SARS has a statutory mandate to, 
 “collect all due revenue, ensure maximum compliance to all the tax and 
customs laws that SARS administers, provide a customs service that 
facilitates legitimate trade, protects our borders and optimises revenue 
collection”5,.  
For SARS to deliver on this mandate it has to maximise the revenue it collects it has to utilise 
all methods available to it in the recovery and collection of outstanding taxes.   
1.2. Rationale and Statement of Purpose   
                                                          
1 The Act came into effect on 1 May 2011. 
2 Namely, section 424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 in relation to a company being wound up as insolvent, 
Section 64 of the Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984 also allows for a piercing of the corporate veil and the Tax 
Administration Act 28 of 2011 allows for attachment of personal liability to responsible 3rd parties, directors and 
shareholders. 
3 Established in terms of the South African Revenue Services Act 34 of 1997. 
4 See note 2, above, 
5 http://www.sars.gov.za/About/HowTax/Pages/Mandate.aspx accessed on 03/08/2017 at 10:04 am  
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This study will explore the common law remedies of piercing the corporate veil and the actio 
pauliana as distinct from the remedies provided under statutory law to SARS in the recovery 
of taxes. The main aim of the study is to explore whether or not  the common law remedies still 
have a role to play in attaching personal liability to fraudulent, reckless and dishonest directors 
and shareholders given that section 20(9) of the Companies Act6 read with the decision of the 
High Court in Ex parte Gore and Others NNO 7 (hereinafter referred to as Ex parte Gore), 
among other statutes which allow for statutory piercing of the corporate veil has expanded the 
application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil by widening the scope and discretion 
of when the court can disregard separate legal personality and attach personal liability to 
directors and shareholders 
 The broad objective of this study is to explore the relevance of common law remedies 
considering partial codification of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and the limited 
use of the actio pauliana by SARS. The study will explore common-law remedies and the new 
statutory remedies to establish if either of them can be applied in cases to the exclusion of the 
other. The study will be achieved through a comparison of the of the common law remedies of 
piecing the corporate veil and the actio pauliana to statutory remedies which allow for piercing 
of the corporate veil under.  
1.3.Research Questions 
This research will seek to consider the following among other pertinent questions: 
(i) What is the distinction between the actio pauliana and the common law remedy of 
piercing the corporate veil compared to the statutory remedy of piercing the corporate 
veil as articulated in the different legislations which provide for piercing the corporate 
veil?  
(ii) Are the common-law remedies of piercing the corporate veil and the actio pauliana still 
relevant to SARS in recovering tax debts? 
(iii) To what extent do the statutory and common law remedies complement each other?  
(iv) Further, can the common-law remedies co-exist with the statutory remedy under the 
New Companies Act? 
                                                          
6 Note 1 above 
7 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC). 
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1.4.Literature Review 
There are wide-ranging writings and academic sources on the subject matter of this research, 
this range from academic textbooks, and journal articles to cases which exhaustively cover the 
topic. These sources will be consulted to establish the principles that govern the application of 
the actio pauliana, with particular reference to the principles set out in Commissioner of 
Customs and Excise v Bank of Lisbon International Ltd & another8 and the work of Andre 
Boraine9 on the actio pauliana among other cases to determine the applicability of the remedy 
to the recovery of taxes by SARS. It will further refer to the principles set out in Cape Pacific 
Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Ply) Ltd10  in determining the definition of piercing the 
corporate veil at common law and the requirements which have to be satisfied for it to apply.  
Academic sources which will be consulted in this dissertation will also refer to writing on the 
subject matter by leading academics in this area of law11. 
The primary legislation source for this research will be the New Companies Act12, this is 
because it has introduced a statutory version of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil at 
common law. Piercing the corporate veil, the courts disregard the separate legal personality of 
a company and that of its directors or shareholders in the process attaching personal liability of 
a company to them. The research will also explore other statutes which allow for piercing of 
the corporate veil and attaching personal liability to directors and shareholders namely section 
424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 1973 Act) which still 
applies in relation to a company being wound up as insolvent, this is despite the fact that in 
most respects the 1973 Act has been repealed. It will also explore section 64 and 65 of the 
Close Corporation Act13.Although the New Companies Act prohibits the registration of any 
new close corporation after 1 May 201114, existing close corporations continue to be 
administered under the Close Corporations Act, 1984 indefinitely.15 The Close Corporations 
Act allows for the piercing of the corporate veil in situations of fraudulent and reckless trading. 
                                                          
8 1994 (1) SA 928 (A). 
9Andre Boraine, Towards Codifying The Actio Pauliana (1996) 8 S. Afr. MerL.J. 213    
10 1995 (4) SA 790 (A) 
11Cassim FHI…et al Contemporary Company Law 2nd ed (2012), Williams RC Concise Corporate Law 2nd ed 
(2013) and Stiglingh, M et al. Silke: South African Income Tax 2013 Durban: Lexis Nexis, (2012) 
12 Ibid 
13 Act 69 of 1984 
14https://www.saica.co.za/Technical/LegalandGovernance/Legislation/CloseCorporationsAct/tabid/1910/langua
ge/en-ZA/Default.aspx> accessed on 17/05/2017 at 09:11 
15 Ibid  
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Further it will also explore piercing the corporate veil under the Tax Administration Act16. This 
Act provides for SARS to attach personal liability on the representative taxpayer, shareholders 
and directors in the event of a juristic person or company defaulting on its tax obligations. 
1.5.Methodology 
The research method used in this dissertation will be desktop research based on qualitative 
analysis, to evaluate the underlying issues. The research will be centred on a review of existing 
literature on the stated subject topic, company law legislation, case law, journal articles, and 
various reputable internet sources. All these sources will be accessed through the University’s 
online databases. This research will refer to these sources in order to understand how our courts 
have applied the law in the said cases.  
  
                                                          
16 The Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 in Sections 152,153,154 and 184 provides for the piercing of the 
corporate veil and attachment of liability to either the responsible taxpayer, directors, shareholders or liable 3 rd 
parties thereby effectively widening the remedies for piercing the corporate veil available to SARS. 
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CHAPTER 2: COMMON LAW REMEDIES   OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE 
VEIL AND THE ACTIO PAULIANA 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter will consist of three discussion points, firstly a discussion on the origins, principles 
and application of the actio pauliana. This discussion will involve an exploration of how this 
remedy has been applied in practice, and its relevance to SARS as an alternative remedy to 
common law piercing the corporate veil. Secondly it will discuss the origins and adoption of 
the common law remedy of lifting the corporate veil into South African law with a bias towards 
the application of this remedy in corporate law cases, with particular reference to the to the 
principles set out in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Ply) Ltd17, in a quest 
to answer the pertinent research questions raised above. Lastly it will examine the use of the 
common law remedy of piecing the corporate veil in tax cases by SARS. This will be achieved 
through examining the principles set out in various cases wherein the courts have applied this 
remedy in favour of SARS to attach personal liability to shareholders and directors who try to 
hide behind the corporate veil to avoid their tax obligation.  
2.2. Actio Pauliana 
The actio pauliana is a remedy which originates from Roman Dutch law and therefore remains 
recognised and still applies in its original form in South African law18. This remedy is available 
to SARS for recovering tax from defaulting debtors will be discussed in this section in detail. 
According to Voet19 
“…the actio pauliana is an action for the recovery of a thing alienated by a 
debtor in fraud of his creditors and that the action arises where the 
fraudulent alienation has been made with the knowledge of the person to 
whom the alienation has been made, that is to say, where the latter has shared 
in the fraud.”20  
                                                          
17 Note 11 above. 
18 De Villiers v Estate Hunt 1939 AD 532 532. 
19 Visser v Hull and Others 2010 (1) SA 521 (WCC) para 13. The Court was making reference to the origins of 
the action pauliana. 
20 Ibid para 13 
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This remedy applies to any transaction aimed at defrauding creditors, in the sense that its 
application results in the setting aside any such transaction21. In Commissioner of Customs and 
Excise v Bank of Lisbon International Ltd22 the court stated the following: 
“It would appear to me moreover that the actio pauliana finds application in 
a case such as the present where the debtor pays into his bank account 
moneys which he has obtained by fraud and which moneys, on being paid 
into the Bank, becomes the property of the Bank. When Reob obtained the 
moneys by fraud from the Commissioner it became indebted to the 
Commissioner in the amount so obtained and became obligated to the 
Commissioner to repay him a like amount. By paying the 1 moneys to the 
Bank, Reob diminished its assets which were available to pay its debt to the 
Commissioner.”23  
The remedy is available if the transaction actually defrauds the creditors in that the assets of 
the person alienating the property are diminished by such alienation24. The action can be 
instituted before or after the sequestration of the debtor25. Boraine26 states that the following 
must be proved “ 
i.  the alienation must have diminished the debtor's assets 
ii.  the recipient must not have received his own property or something 
owing to him; 
iii.  (the debtor or alienator must have intended to defraud his creditors 
(if he received value in respect of the alienation, the recipient must 
also have been aware of the debtor's intention);  
iv.  (d) The fraud must have caused the loss suffered by the creditors. 
The intention to defraud still plays a significant role here”.  
                                                          
21 Fenhalls v Ebrahim 1956(4) SA 723(N) 
22 1994 (1) SA 928 (A) at 208H-I 
23 Ibid at para 208H-I 
24 Ibid  
25 Note 9 above at page 213   
26 Ibid at page 225 
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The fraud being referred in this situation is not 'fraud' in the criminal sense of the term but 
refers to an act which will have the effect of prejudicing the creditor’s ability to recover the 
debt owed to him27. 
It is trite law that the action can be only instituted if the alienation caused or increased the 
insolvency of the debtor28. In Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Bank of Lisbon 
International Ltd29  the action was, however, allowed in a situation where no proof existed that 
the debtor was actually insolvent30.  This means that this evolution of the actio pauliana has 
made it a remedy of general application in cases wherein the claimant suffers loss as a result 
of fraudulent transfers, hence it can be instituted by SARS as a remedy in any situation which 
involves an intention to defraud by a taxpayer. 
The actio pauliana forms part of our common law and is available where a debtor “disposes 
of assets with the intent to defraud, in these cases a court can set aside the disposition, provided 
that the alienee was a party to the fraud and had acquired the property, even if innocently, ex 
titulo lucrativa, that is to say gratuitously, for no consideration”31.  In essence any attempt to 
diminish the value of a transaction whether through a simulated transaction or by a malicious 
donation will evoke the application of the actio pauliana. This action can only be evoked if the 
person who receives the property is party to the fraud or receives it as a donation for free.  
The most obvious situation in which the actio pauliana can be invoked is where a person faced 
with imminent bankruptcy gives away his property to friends and family in order to defeat the 
claims of his creditors. Mars goes on to state the following: 
 “Whenever a debtor enters into a transaction in fraud of or in actual 
detriment of his creditors if it is proved that the actual disposition diminished 
the debtor’s asset, and that the intention was to defraud the actio pauliana 
remedy is available to the creditor”32. 
                                                          
27 Note that the fraud referred to in insolvency cases differs from its criminal meaning (Boraine (2007) TSAR 
529fn 105). In insolvency cases the plaintiff must establish that the debtor knew that he was insolvent at the 
time the disposition was made and intended to defraud his creditors with the disposition (Hockey 122; Scharff v 
Trustee Scharff 1915 TPD 463 476). 
28 Ibid at page 227 
29 Note 23 above.  
30 Note 27 above. 
31 South African Institute of Chartered Accountants Newsletter 2165 
https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2013/2165.Piercing the corporate veil.htm accessed on 8 March 2017 at 
14:37 
32 Mars the Law of Insolvency in South Africa. 9th Edition 2008 Chapter 13 -281 
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 It is not an essential of this common-law remedy that the debtor's estate shall have been placed 
under sequestration33. Thus where a debtor had drawn up but not signed a statement of affairs 
for the surrender of his estate as insolvent and his principal creditor, knowing this, induced him 
to withdraw the statement of affairs and to transfer what was virtually his whole estate to him 
to satisfy his debt and those of certain other creditors, such transaction was held to be a fraud 
on the other creditors and liable to be set aside at common law34. This allows for other creditors 
leeway to initiate the action even if the debtor has already transferred his entire estate to a single 
creditor as long as they can prove that the effect of the transfer was to effectively defraud them 
of their share of the insolvent estate. 
In Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Metlika Trading Limited and 
others35SARS raised the actio pauliana as in the alternative to common law piercing the 
corporate veil. However, in the Court’s judgment, the court only applied the remedy of 
common law piercing the corporate veil to reach the verdict. In this the court in Commissioner 
for South African Revenue Services effectively passed an opportunity to at least provide a 
guideline on how this remedy is to be applied as an alternative remedy to the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil at common law by SARS in tax cases. It is a misfortune that the 
court failed to shed more light on of the common law actio pauliana in cases of this nature. 
Although the actio pauliana is available, in practice it is rarely used by SARS due to the fact 
that it is difficult to prove all the requirements. SARS has however used this very same remedy 
to great effect in matrimonial law cases36. This is because in matrimonial cases attempts to 
defraud SARS usually involve simple transactions which can be easily ascertained to be 
fraudulent on face of it, for example an attempt to transfer assets from an estate which is owing 
SARS.  
Reported judgments show that common law remedies, like the actio pauliana, can be more 
flexible and powerful weapons against tax avoidance than remedies laid down in legislation37. 
Statutory remedies are confined to the wording used in the Act, while common law remedies 
are founded on principles, which have a broad application and are not confined by verbal 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 
34Domanski A Piercing the corporate veil-A New Direction (1986) SALJ 224 at page 227 
35(2004) ZASCA 97   
36 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Hulett; 1990 (2) SA 786 (A), Visser v Hull and Others 2010 (1) SA 
521 (WCC) 
37 Tax Avoidance 1296. Assets disposed of to pre-empt attachment and sale in execution May 2005 – Issue 69 
https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2005/1296_Assets_disposed_of_to_pre_empt_attachment_and_sale_in_e
xecution.htm accessed on 16 August 2017 at 1317 
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formulae; this gives them a very wide leeway to be interpreted38. In Commissioner for the South 
African Revenue Service v Metlika, the court missed a golden opportunity for the High Court 
to lay down in what circumstances the actio pauliana applies in modern South African law as 
between SARS and taxpayers39. 
 2.3. The Corporate Veil 
 In the simplest of terms, the corporate veil which is also referred to as the “veil of 
incorporation” is defined as the is an artificial veil which is created upon incorporation and 
registration of a company which separates the personality of a corporation from the 
personalities of its shareholders and directors, and protects them from being personally liable 
for the company's debts and other obligations. This doctrine originates from the doctrine of 
limited liability that the British Parliament granted to English companies in the Limited 
Liability Act of 185540. This doctrine was first tested in relation to the separate legal personality 
of one-man companies in Salomon v Salomon41handed down by the United Kingdom’s, House 
of Lords where the Court stated that: - “a company is a legal person in its own right and the 
collonary that its shareholders and directors are not personally liable for its debts”.42 In this 
case the Court further went on to state that:  
“The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to 
the memorandum; and though it may be that after incorporation the business 
is precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers 
and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent 
of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers as members 
liable in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner provided 
by the Act. That is, I think, the declared intention of the enactment”43. 
The doctrine of separate legal personality (corporate veil) was adopted in our law by the 
decision in Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipality Council44 by the Appellate Division. In this 
                                                          
38 Ibid  
39 Ibid  
40Halpern P, Trebilcock M & Turnbull S, “An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law,” U. 
Toronto L.J. 117, 118–19 (1980)  
41 Judge S and Moore I, Questions & Answers Company Law 4th ed Oxford University Press   
 2014 
42 Ibid  
43 Ibid at para 51 
44 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipality Council 1920 AD 530. 
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case the court held that the property of the company belongs solely to the company not to its 
directors and shareholders. Innes CJ went on to say that: -  
“a registered company is a legal persona distinct from the members who 
compose nor is the position affected by the circumstance that a controlling 
interest in the concern may be held by a single member”45.   
The court further went on to state that: -  
“This conception of the existence of the company as a separate entity distinct 
from its founders is no merely artificial technical thing. It is a matter of 
substance; property vested in the company is not, and cannot be, regarded as 
vested in all or any of its members”46. 
The principle of separate legal personality asserts that a company is capable of owning its own 
property to the exclusion of directors and shareholders. Innes CJ in Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp 
Municipal Council47 giving the judgment of the court held that:  
“Taking the intention then to be the prohibition of ownership of fixed 
property by the Asiatic and prohibition of the acquisition and occupation of 
mining rights by the Coloured people, I come to enquire whether the 
transaction complained of is a contravention of the statutes. In other words, 
whether the ownership by Dadoo Ltd, is in substance ownership by its Asiatic 
shareholders. Clearly in law it is not. A registered company is a legal 
persona distinct from the members who compose it”48.  
This principle has further been engraved into our law by the fact that our Constitution49 
recognises the rights of juristic persons as separate from natural persons. Section 8(2) in the 
Bill of Rights50 binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, 
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right51‘. 
                                                          
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid  
47 Note 41 above 
48 Ibid at page 550 
49 Act 108 0f 1996 
50 Ibid 
51 Ibid  
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Section 8(4) goes on to state that “A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights 
to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person”52. 
The effect of the corporate veil is that it creates a separation between the actions of shareholders 
and that of the company. In that it shields the shareholders and directors from potential liability 
for the actions of the company merely because they are shareholders or directors. The corporate 
veil is an important vehicle in world commerce as it limits shareholders’ financial exposure to 
the amount of money they invested in the corporation by making a clear distinction between 
the financial and tax obligation of the individual shareholder from the corporation in which 
they would have invested. 
2.4. Piercing of the Corporate Veil at Common Law in South African Law 
Lifting the corporate veil is defined as when the courts disregard the separate legal personality 
of a company and that of its directors or shareholders and treat the liabilities or activities of a 
company as the rights or liabilities of its directors or shareholders53. The theory underlying this 
approach is that “only a 'real' company, a company 'in substance and not just in form' can claim 
entity status; as a theory it seems hard to fault”54.  In Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime 
Ltd55  the court stated that “to pierce the corporate veil is an expression that I would reserve 
for treating the rights or liabilities or activities of a company as the rights or liabilities or 
activities of its shareholders56”.  
M.S Blackman57, commenting on the issue is of the opinion that, piercing the corporate veil 
takes at least two forms, firstly, there are cases where the court disregards the company and 
treats the members as if they had been acting in partnership, with the consequence that they 
are, for example, held to be the owners of property otherwise owned by the company, or to be 
personally liable for its debts and other liabilities.’ Secondly, there are those cases where 
obligations incurred by shareholders in their personal capacity are treated as if they were 
incurred by the company58. Williams states that the law recognises that in certain circumstances 
the Salomon principle can be over ridden and that the corporate veil can be pierced at common 
law, he further does on to discuss the traditional categories’ wherein the courts have 
                                                          
52 Ibid 
53 FHI Cassim…et al Contemporary Company Law 2nd ed (2012) 
54 Ibid at page 41 
55  (1991) 4 All SA 769 (CA), at 779 
56 Ibid  
57 MS Blackman Companies LAWSA vol 4, Part 1, 1st Reissue (1995) para 42. 
58 Ibid  
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traditionally disregarded the doctrine of separate legal personality59. FHI Cassim60 goes on to 
state that, “when lifting the corporate veil, the protection afforded to shareholders and 
directors is removed the substance rather the form in which the company is cast will be looked 
at”61.   
The corporate veil being referred in this doctrine is a metaphorical veil, in essence a way of 
simply expressing the difference between directors and shareholders to the company as a 
distinct entity from its controllers. In defining the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, Larkin 
argues that”,   
“It asserts in certain circumstances, a court is empowered to disregard the 
principle of the separate legal existence of a company and so achieve a more 
acceptable result. As the metaphor has it, in the appropriate circumstances 
a court can 'lift', or 'pierce', the 'veil' which otherwise ensures the 
individuality of a company, careless of the consequences, both by separating 
it from those connected with it ('the corporators')”62. 
This position is reiterated by Williams where he states that” the metaphorical corporate veil 
does not however completely obscure the internal workings of the company from public 
view63”. 
The corporate veil has been pierced in a wide range of cases for example where company is 
used as a mere facade or sham concealing the true intention of the shareholders64, in cases of 
fraud, dishonesty or improper conduct65  and where there is improper use of a company66. This 
is however not a closed list, as our law has to date failed to formulate a single, coherent 
principle or test upon which to base decisions to disregard the separate juristic personality of a 
company as a remedy to an aggrieved party67. 
The position that the law is far from settled with regards to the circumstances where it would 
be permissible to pierce the corporate veil was reiterated in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner 
                                                          
59RC Williams Concise Corporate Law 2nd ed (2013).  
60 Note 46 above at page 42 
61 Ibid at 45 
62  M P Larkin 'Regarding Judicial Disregarding of the Company's Separate Identity' (1989) 1 SA Merc LJ 277  
63 Note 48 above 
64 Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA 558 at 568.   
65 Note 48 above at 553 
66 The Shipping Corporation of India Pty Ltd v Evdomon Corporation and Another 1994 (1) SA 550 (A. 
67  Ibid at 53 
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Controlling Investments (Ply) Ltd68 .The court in The Shipping Cooperation of India Ltd v 
Evdoman Corporation and Another, indicated that it is not necessary to attempt to define the 
circumstances in which the corporate veil will be pierced69.In Zeman v Quickelberge and 
Another70, AJ Nicholson stated that:  
“The general principle underlying the lifting of the corporate veil is that when a corporation 
is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person it may be disregarded. While the corporate 
veil is normally lifted to identify the shareholders or individuals who are the true perpetrators 
of a company‘s acts.”71 
Traditionally our courts had created categories of when to breach the corporate veil72. These 
categories were rejected in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Ply) Ltd73, by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal. The rejection of a categorising approach is commendable 
because categorising could lead to uncertainty in our law and restrictive application as 
categories do not constitute an exhaustive list of instances in which the corporate veil will be 
pierced and the authorities tend to differ on the applicable categories. 
Thus, it has been suggested that the veil ought to be pierced 'merely on account of equity74.  
The position that the corporate veil ought to be pierced “on account of equity’ is supported by 
Domanski75, who has argued for an approach in terms of which 'the policies behind recognition 
of a separate corporate existence must be balanced against the policies justifying piercing76'. 
The court in  Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd77 in support of the 
position that equity must play a central role in common law piercing of the corporate veil states 
that,  “the policies behind the recognition of a separate corporate existence must be balanced 
against the policies justifying piercing”78Putting the matter of categorised approaches to rest, 
FHI Cassim goes on to state that the courts have formulated salutary principles which apply to 
piercing of the corporate veil which are as follows: 
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i. That we do not have a categorised approach when piercing the 
corporate veil 
ii. The court has to adopt a balancing principle of weighing separate 
legal principle and the principle in favour of piercing the corporate 
veil. 
iii. That the concept of corporate entity is almost inviolable and that they 
would not easily or readily disregard the principle79.  
In the Cape Pacific case the court was of the opinion that although the piercing the corporate 
veil is a special remedy it is however not a remedy of last resort as was the traditional view at 
common law80. The position that piercing the corporate veil at common law is not a remedy of 
last resort set in Cape Pacific was overturned  by the same court in  Hülse-Reutter and Others 
v Gödde where the Supreme Court stated that if there is another alternative remedy the court 
will not pierce the corporate veil81. It must be noted that at common law piercing the corporate 
veil is an exceptional procedure and therefore, special or exceptional circumstances must exist 
before the court could pierce the veil82. In the Hulse-Rutter v Godde case the court went on to 
state that: 
 “There can be no doubt that the separate legal personality of a company is 
to be recognised and upheld except in the most unusual circumstances. A 
court has no general discretion simply to disregard the existence of a 
separate corporate identity whenever it considers it just or convenient to do 
so. The circumstances in which a court will disregard the distinction between 
a corporate entity and those who control it are far from settled, as this will 
depend on a close analysis of the facts of each case, considerations of policy 
and judicial judgment. Nonetheless, what is clear is that as a matter of 
principle in a case such as the present there must at least be some misuse or 
abuse of the distinction between the corporate entity and those who control 
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it which results in an unfair advantage being afforded to the latter83”. 
 
From the above arguments it is clear that the separate legal personality between an entity and 
its shareholders and directors remained 'a cornerstone of our company law' and that the test 
should be applied 'cautiously and with the protection of the separate personality as a fore most 
consideration84 . However, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil at common law is difficult 
to ascertain due to the fact that there are no clear ascertainable universal principles for its 
application. 
2.5. Piercing of the Corporate Veil by SARS at Common Law 
SARS has effectively used the common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in litigation 
against companies frequently in tax litigation with relative success. These cases illustrate how 
shareholders and directors can be held liable for tax debts which ordinarily would be company 
liabilities in cases of fraud and improper use of separate legal personality. One of the earliest 
cases in which SARS used this doctrine is in Ochberg v Commissioner for Inland Revenue85, 
in this case the court was dealing with simulated transactions. De Villiers CJ, commenting on 
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil stated that:  
"The law endows a company with a fictitious personality. The wisdom of 
allowing a person to escape the natural consequences of his commercial sins 
under the ordinary law, and for his own private purposes virtually to turn 
him into a corporation with limited liability, may well be open to doubt. But 
as long as the law allows it the Court has to recognise the position. But then 
too the person himself must abide by that. A company, being a juristic person, 
remains a juristic person separate and distinct from the person who may own 
all the shares, and must not be confused with the latter. To say that a 
company sustains a separate persona and yet in the same breath to argue 
that in substance the person holding all the shares is the company is an 
attempt to have it both ways, which cannot be allowed. 
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In ITC 161186  the tax court held that SARS could attempt to brush aside the entity's legal 
persona by applying the "piercing of the corporate veil" doctrine” although it is a radical step87. 
The court further went on to state that:"... a court can lift the veil only if that is legitimate by 
application of established doctrines, such as the plus valet rule or the fraus legis rule (or in 
other cases of fraud or dishonesty) or, possibly, the actio pauliana, that is if the requirements 
for such application are present, or a finding of a true relationship of principal and agent. 
There is, we consider, no self-standing doctrine of piercing the veil.88" 
In the recent case of Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Metlika Trading 
Limited and others89 where SARS initiated an action for the piercing the corporate veil a 
common law against Metlika and Ben Nevis alleging that the transfer of its assets by Ben Nevis 
to Metlika Trading Limited had been made with the intention, of dissipating the Ben Nevis 
assets in order to defraud SARS by rendering Ben Nevis’s tax debt irrecoverable. 
 The Court in CSARS v Metlika Trading and others90 in reaching it judgment applied the 
principles set out in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd91, which state 
the following,  
"It is undoubtedly a salutary principle that our Courts should not lightly 
disregard a company's separate personality, but should strive to give effect 
to and uphold it. To do otherwise would negate or undermine the policy and 
principles that underpin the concept of separate corporate personality and 
the legal consequences that attach to it. But where fraud, dishonesty or the 
improper conduct (and I confine myself to such situations) is found to be 
present, other considerations will come into play. The need to preserve the 
separate corporate identity would in such circumstances have to be balanced 
against policy considerations which arise in favour of piercing the corporate 
veil92 . 
The Court held that the way in which Bermuda Trust had conducted the affairs of Ben Nevis 
“was improper, to say the least” and that “Metlika was based as a façade to hide the tax liability 
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of Ben Nevis from SARS”93. The court held that the on analysis of the facts of the matter before 
it piercing the corporate veil in relation to the tax liability owed by Ben Nevis to SARS was 
justifiable, and went on to pierce the corporate veil in its judgment and declaring that the 
transfer of assets from Ben Nevis to Metlika be set aside paving way for SARS to sale the 
assets in order to recover the tax debt from Ben Navis94. 
2.6. Concluding remarks    
In conclusion SARS has used the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil at common to attach 
personal liability to directors and shareholders in cases of fraud, dishonesty and improper 
conduct to great effect. However, the actio pauliana has been used sparingly despite its 
potential to be every effective remedy in tax cases given that its basis in common principles 
which can be interpreted to apply in a lot of scenarios wherein SARS will want to pierce the 
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CHAPTER 3: STATUTORY REMEDIES THAT PROVIDE FOR PIERCING OF THE 
CORPORATE VEIL 
 3.1.1. Introduction 
This chapter will entail a detailed discussion of the various statutes available to SARS which 
allow for the piercing of the corporate veil. The discussion will involve a critical analysis of 
section 20 (9) of the new Companies Act which effectively introduced the statutory version of 
the common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil into our legislation. The discussion will 
involve examining the application other sections of various legislations which allow for 
statutory piercing of the corporate veil. The discussion will include an in-depth look at the 
application of the following statutes to pierce the corporate veil in tax litigation, Close 
Corporation Act 64 of 1984, Section 424 of Companies Act of 1973 and the Section 180 of the 
Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. 
3.1.2. Section 20(9) of Companies Act 71 of 2008  
For the first time in South African law the common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil 
has been partially codified, through section 20 (9) of the new Companies Act 95.Williams notes 
that the Companies Act does not specifically refer to lifting or piercing the corporate veil  in 
section 20(9)96 .However the wording of the new Companies Act under the same section  
permits court to disregard the separate legal personality of a company and to pierce the 
corporate veil in instances of ”an unconscionable abuse” of the juristic personality of the 
company. Section 20 (9) state that: -  
“On application by an interested person or in any proceedings in which a 
company is involved, a court finds that the incorporation of the company, any 
use of the company, or any act by or on behalf of the company, constitutes 
an unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the company as a 
separate entity, the court may- 
a) declare that the company is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in 
respect of any right, obligation or liability of the company or of a shareholder 
of the company or, in the case of a non-profit company, a member of the 
company, or of another person specified in the declaration; and 
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b) Make any further order the court considers appropriate to give effect 
to a declaration contemplated in paragraph (a).” 
The above mentioned section effectively gives a court the general statutory powers and 
discretion to disregard the separate legal personality between a company and its shareholders 
and directors thus allowing for the piercing of the corporate veil on application to the court by 
an interested person, in instances where there has been an “unconscionable abuse of the juristic 
personality”97.  
Section 20 (9) however does not go on to define the relationship between this new enactment 
and the traditional common law remedy of piecing the corporate veil. Unlike section 20(7) and 
20 (8) of the same Act, which expressly state that the common law still applies to the sections98. 
It can be concluded that the legislature left it to the courts to act as a guide in construing the 
relationship between section 20(9) and the common law99. In Ex parte Gore the court stated 
that:  
“The introduction of the statutory provision has given rise to some debate on 
whether the subsection has replaced the common law on piercing the 
corporate veil. Certainly there is no express intention apparent to that 
effect…but, equally, there is no express indication that the intention is not to 
displace the common law….”100 
The court went on further to state that 
"The statute enjoins that its provisions be construed with appropriate regard 
to subsections 5(1) and (2) read with s 7 of the Act (including, to the extent 
appropriate, a consideration of foreign company law). Approaching the 
interpretation of s 20(9) of the Companies Act in that manner I am unable to 
identify any discord between it and the approach to piercing the corporate 
veil evinced in the cases decided before it came into operation."101 
                                                          
97 Kim-Leigh Siebritz “Piercing the corporate veil: A critical analysis of section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 
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Therefore, the courts have an obligation to iron out this relationship and formulate the 
guidelines on how the section will affect piercing the corporate veil at common law.  
3.1.3 Unconscionable Abuse. 
The phrase ‘unconscionable abuse’ is not defined in section 20(9), in this the section fails to 
provide any guidance on the facts or circumstances that would constitute an ‘unconscionable 
abuse’ of juristic personality nor does it try to define the term102. According to The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary, the definition of ‘unconscionable’ is conduct that is ‘unreasonably 
excessive103’. The Free Dictionary defines ‘unconscionable’ as ‘unusually harsh and shocking 
to the conscience; that which is so grossly unfair that a court will proscribe it104’. Given that 
this phrase is central in determining on when the Courts can pierce the corporate veil the 
omission is regrettable 105 
The Court in Ex parte Gore asserted that the words “unconscionable abuse of the juristic 
personality of a company’ used in s 20(9) suggest behaviour in relation to the formation and 
use of companies that is diverse enough to cover all the descriptive terms such as ‘sham’, 
‘device’, ‘stratagem’, and conceivably much more”.106 It further went on to  say that this 
indicates that the remedy may be used whenever the illegitimate use of the concept of juristic 
personality adversely affects a third party in a way that reasonably should not be 
countenanced107 .It has been suggested that the courts should look to section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act108 which is similar in wording to section 20(9) of the Companies Act for a 
definition of the phrase through an analysis of how the courts have dealt with the former Act. 
The section states as follows: 109 
 “Whenever a Court on application by an interested person, or in any 
proceedings in which a corporation is involved, finds that the incorporation 
of, or any act by or on behalf of, or any use of, that corporation, constitutes 
a gross abuse of the juristic personality of the corporation as a separate 
                                                          
102   Cassim R Piercing The Veil Under Section 20(9) Of The Companies Act 26 (2014) S. Afr. Mercantile L.J. 
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103 Thompson D (ed) 9ed (Clarendon Press 1995) at 1519) 
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entity, the Court may declare that the corporation is to be deemed not to be 
a juristic person in respect of such rights, obligations or liabilities of the 
corporation, or of such member or members thereof, or of such other person 
or persons, as are specified in the declaration, and the Court may give such 
further order or orders.” 
This is the approach adopted by the court in Ex parte Gore, in ascertaining the meaning of 
unconscionable abuse, the court refereed to the Close Corporation Act, stating the following. 
 “The provision is closely similar to, but not exactly the same as, that in s 65 
of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. Certainly there is no express 
intention apparent to that effect, as for example to be seen in s 165(1) of the 
Act (concerning derivative actions), but, equally, there is no express 
indication that the intention is not to displace the common law, like that to 
be found in s 161(2)(b) (concerning remedies available to protect the rights 
of the holders of securities in companies).”  
R. Cassim commenting on the issue under discussion stated that; -  
“in defining unconscionable abuse, the court in Ex parte  Gore stated that the 
words ‘unconscionable abuse’ are less extreme than the words ‘gross abuse’, 
which are used in s 65 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 in a similarly 
worded provision to s 20(9) of the Act”110. 
 However, a significant difference between section 20(9) of the new Companies Act and section 
65 of the Close Corporations Act is that section 65, allows the courts disregard the juristic 
personality of a company in instances of a ‘gross abuse’, while section 20(9) of the new 
Companies Act allows the courts disregard the juristic personality of a company where there 
is an ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic personality by its directors or shareholders. 
The court in Ex parte Gore ‘defined the phrase “unconscionable abuse”, as follows”  
‘unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of a company’ postulates 
conduct in relation to the formation and use of companies diverse enough to 
cover all the descriptive terms like ‘sham’, ‘device’, ‘stratagem’ and the like 
                                                          
110 Ibid  
- 29 - 
 
used in that connection in the earlier cases, and - as the current case 
illustrates - conceivably much more.”111   
The Court in Ex parte Gore left it open for the phrase to be interpreted as wide as conceivably 
possible. It must be noted that the definition of unconscionable abuse as set out in Ex parte 
Gore does not really help in formulating substantive principles on when the corporate veil can 
be pierced under the new Companies Act. This is because the use of metaphors and pejorative 
expressions in this case obstructed the court from formulating obstruct substantive principles 
on the matter112.  
Further section 20(9) of the new Companies Act uses the phrase “the court may” which means 
even if the requirements of the section are fulfilled, a court is not obliged to pierce the corporate 
veil, but has a discretion whether to do so113. R Cassim concludes that Section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act “has conferred extensive powers on the South African Courts to pierce the 
corporate veil, powers that do not exist under common law for example the power to invoke 
section 20(9) by a court of its own initiative, regardless of whether the litigant in the matter 
before the court has requested the court to do so”114. 
The decision in Ex Parte Gore regardless on its failure to establish concrete principles on the 
meaning of unconscionable abuse is welcome as it provides a guide on how to interpret section 
20 (9) of the Companies Act. The approach of the court in Ex parte Gore was heavily influenced 
by the judgment in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd115specifically 
by the comments of the Appellate Division on the test for unconscionable injustice laid down 
in Botha v Van Niekerk116 the court went on to state the following:  
“With due respect to the learned judge I would avoid, in a matter such as the 
present, what is perhaps too rigid a test and opt for a more flexible approach 
-one that allows the facts of each case ultimately to determine whether the 
piercing of the corporate veil is called for.” 
 The above quote read together with the interpretation of section 20(9) of the Companies Act, 
in Ex parte Gore and the use descriptive terms such as ‘sham’, ‘device’, ‘stratagem’, and 
                                                          
111 Ex parte Gore at para 34 
112 Note 102 above  at 336 
113 Ibid at  page 311 
114 Ibid at page 327 
115Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd at 805 
116 1983 (3) SA 513 (W) 
- 30 - 
 
‘conceivably much more’ points out to the fact that there is no fixed set of scenarios where the 
court will establish that there is unconscionable abuse, however it is on a case by case basis 
and the courts must the very flexible in the way they approach piercing the corporate veil under 
the new Companies Act.  
Section 20 (9) of the new Companies Act represents a new direction and shift in thinking with 
regards to the scope and application of the remedy of piercing the corporate veil. The legislature 
has given the courts a discretion to interpret the section broadly, given the language of section 
20 (9) does not define 'unconscionable abuse'. This in light of the precedent set in Natal Joint 
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality117 where the court stated: -    
“If interpretation is, as all agree it is, an exercise in ascertaining the meaning 
of the words used in the statute and is objective in form, it is unrelated to 
whatever intention those responsible for the words may have had at the time 
they selected them.”  
Section 20 (9) of the new Companies Act creates a very powerful remedy at the disposal of 
SARS as the statutory remedy is not bound by any common law limitation and has room to be 
interpreted as wide as possible as long as it is within the language used in the section. 
The court in Gore118 confirmed and stated that the ambit of section 20(9) appears indeed to 
have broadened the bases upon which South African courts have hitherto under the common 
law been prepared to grant relief that entails disregarding corporate personality119.R Cassim 
states that section 20 (9) offers certainty and visibility of the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil as a remedy however it creates a rigid test given that the term 'unconscionable abuse' is not 
defined in the new Companies Act120. This however will only be seen as more cases on the 
interpretation of the section come before the courts on whether the section 20 (9) will create a 
rigid test to the application of the remedy 
3.2.1. Section 424 of Companies Act 61 of 1973  
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Section 424 of the old Companies Act121 is still in force with regards to piercing the corporate 
veil in the context of winding up in insolvency122.  This is because the new Companies Act 
Schedule 5(9)123 explicitly allows for the survival of the section. The schedule provides that: 
‘when it appears, whether it be in a winding-up, judicial management or 
otherwise, that any business of the company was or is being carried on 
recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of 
any other person or for any fraudulent purpose, the Court may, on the 
application of the Master, the liquidator, the judicial manager, any creditor, 
or member or contributory of the company, declare that any person who was 
knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in the manner aforesaid 
shall be personally responsible, without any limitation of liability, for or all 
or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company as the Court may 
direct’.124  
The 1973 Companies Act in section 424 stated that someone can be held personally liable for 
a company’s debt where the individual knowingly was party to the carrying on of the business 
of the company “recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors of the company125.” The purpose 
of s424 (1) has been interpreted by the courts to be, to attach personal liability to all persons 
who act in a reckless and fraudulent manner in the conduct of business transactions. In Pressma 
Services (Pty) Ltd v Schuttler and Another126  Van Schalkwyk AJ held that “The clear purpose 
of s 424(1) is to render personally liable all persons who knowingly participate in the 
fraudulent or reckless conduct of the business of a company”127. In Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others 
v JR Snyman & Others128.Howie JA held that ‘the legislative intention in enacting s 424 was 
to broaden the scope of the earlier provision and to extend the remedy by means of which a 
restraining influence can be exercised on over-sanguine directors’. Howie JA went on to 
interpret section 424 in a manner which broadened the scope of liability and provided for 
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unlimited liability for debts and liabilities against any person who carries the business of the 
company recklessly or fraudulently129.  
Achada, argues that “the intention of s424 (1) is protect creditors and prevent fraudulent and 
reckless trading of directors of the company as ‘it was enacted to provide a remedy against 
fraudulent and/or reckless behaviour by directors”130.  Further other authors131 have argued 
that the purpose of s424 (1) has two folds namely that it exists to render all those who are 
knowingly party to the carrying of business of the company recklessly or fraudulently 
personally liable for the debts or wrongful conduct; and to benefit creditors a ‘meaningful 
remedy against fraudulent and reckless trading’132.  
The 1973 Companies Act provided in section 424 that someone could be personally liable for 
a company's debt where the individual knowingly was party to the carrying on of the business 
of the company "recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors of the company”. The SCA set 
out the policy considerations underpinning the old section 424 as follows: - 
“In this sense their separate existence remains a figment of law, liable to be 
curtailed or withdrawn when the objects of their creation are abused or 
thwarted. The section retracts the fundamental attribute of corporate 
personality, namely separate legal existence, with its corollary of 
autonomous and independent liability for debts, when the level of 
mismanagement of the corporation’s affairs exceeds the merely inept or 
incompetent and becomes heedlessly gross or dishonest.133” 
3.2.2 Reckless Trading Under Section 424 of the Old Companies Act. 
Acting ‘recklessly’134 consists in “an entire failure to give consideration to the consequences 
of one’s actions, in other words, an attitude of reckless disregard of such consequences”.135  In 
applying the recklessness test to any set of facts the courts must consider all the relevant factors 
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in order to establish recklessness. The court in the case of Fisheries Development Corporation 
of SA Ltd v Jorgensen specified that: - 
 “it must give regard to amongst other things the corporation’s scope of 
operations, the members’ roles, functions and powers, the amount of the 
debts, the extent of the financial difficulties and the prospects of recovery, 
plus the particular circumstances of the claim ‘and the extent to which the 
member has departed from the standards of a reasonable man in regard 
thereto”.136 
Henochsberg137 state that ‘recklessly’ means carrying business on ‘by conduct which evinces 
a lack of any genuine concern for its prosperity138. The concept of “recklessness” must be 
ascribed its ordinary meaning, means significantly more than ordinary negligence, at the very 
least, it means gross negligence. In applying the test for recklessness, the court will also take 
account of factors such as the scope of operations of the company, the role, function and powers 
of its members as well as the financial position of the corporation139. The SCA held as follows: 
- 
“In evaluating the conduct of directors, courts should not be astute to 
stigmatise decisions made by businessmen as reckless simply because 
perceived entrepreneurial options did not in the event pan out. What is 
required is not the application of the exact science of hindsight, but a value 
judgment bearing in mind what was known, or ought reasonably to have been 
known, by individual directors at the time the decisions were made. In 
making this value judgment, courts can usefully be guided by the opinions of 
businessmen who move in the world of commerce and who are called upon 
to make these decisions in the performance of their functions as directors of 
companies, and by experts who advise businessmen in the making of such 
decisions or who evaluate them at the time they are made.140” 
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A company will be trading recklessly if it carry on to incurring debt honestly when reasonable 
businessmen in the position of the directors of that company would believe that there is no 
reasonable prospect of the creditors receiving payment when due. If the debt is incurred 
dishonestly, for example without an intention to repay it on the due date, the conduct would 
constitute fraudulent trading141.  
Section 424 of the old Companies Act is a potent remedy to SARS in the recovery of taxes 
owed to it by defaulting debtors as gives a wide discretion on the courts on when to piece the 
corporate veil. This is because it specifically states recklessness and fraudulent intent have to 
prove on a case by case basis allowing the courts to apply it very broadly. Section 424 (1) of 
the old Companies Act is a far reaching provision as it provides that a party to the carrying on 
of the business of the company in the aforesaid conduct is liable without any limitation142. 
Section 424 is only available to SARS when a company is winding down or in liquidation. In 
the past in the past SARS has not relied on section 424 of the old Companies Act to establish 
personal liability. Perhaps it is because the evidentiary burden relating to fraudulent and 
reckless trading is difficult to prove. 
3.3. Section 65 of the Close Corporation Act 65 of 1984  
The new Companies Act has not repealed the Close Corporations Act No. 69 of 1984 (‘herein 
after Close Corporations Act”), nor has it done away with close corporations.143. This position 
is supported by a recent notice issued by the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission144 which expressly state that it is neither the intention of the legislature nor of 
CIPC to repeal the existing sections of the Close Corporation Act no to convert existing close 
corporations into companies145. This means that SARS can still use section 65 of the Close 
Corporation Act to recover outstanding tax debts from close corporations. Section 65 state that: 
“Whenever a Court on application by an interested person, or in any 
proceedings in which a corporation is involved, finds that the incorporation 
of, or any act by or on behalf of, or any use of, that corporation, constitutes 
                                                          
141 Ex Parte: De Villiers and Another NNO: In Re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) ZASCA 220; 
[1993] at para 24 
142 R Naidoo Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 180. 
143  https://www.coxyeats.co.za/FileHandler.ashx?fguid=8a6ce301-0781-407e-90c5 accessed on 09/09/2017 at 
1547hrs 
144 CIPC's primary institutional mandate is derived from the Companies Act, 2008, which establishes CIPC as a 
juristic person 
145 CIPC Notice to Customers 53 of 2016 issued on 31/10 /2016  
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a gross abuse of the juristic personality of the corporation as a separate 
entity, the Court may declare that the corporation is to be deemed not to be 
a juristic person in respect of such rights, obligations or liabilities of the 
corporation, or of such member or members thereof, or of such other person 
or persons, as are specified in the declaration, and the Court may give such 
further order or orders as it may deem fit in order to give effect to such 
declaration”. 
 In Ebrahim v Airports Cold Storage146 the court stated that an entire failure to give 
consideration to the consequences of one’s action will be viewed as recklessness allowing the 
court to pierce the corporate veil147. The court went on to state that: 
“When the concept of recklessness was applied as a test to the running of a close corporation, 
regard had to be had, inter alia, to the CC's scope of operations, the members' roles, functions 
and powers, the amount of the debts, the extent of the financial difficulties and the prospects of 
recovery, plus the particular circumstances of the claim 'and the extent to which the [member] 
has departed from the standards of a reasonable man in regard thereto”148'.  
It must be noted however that in Ebrahim v Airports Cold Storage149 the court in its judgment 
did not apply section 65 of the Close Corporation Act150, it relied on section 64 of the same 
Act151 to dismiss the appellant’s appeal as it deemed the application of section 64(1) on its own 
enough to attach liability to the appellants. In the court aquo the High Court had pierced the 
corporate veil of the close corporation in terms of section 65 of the Act152. In the recent case of 
                                                          
146 2008 (6) SA 585 (SCA) 
147 Ibid 
148 Ibid at para at 591C - E 
149 Ibid 
150 Ibid at para 25. The Supreme court of Appeal went on to state that “This conclusion makes it unnecessary to 
go further and make a finding as to whether the Ebrahims' conduct also amounted to fraud. It is likewise 
unnecessary to consider the application of s 65 (abuse of separate juristic personality) and s 63(h) (no 
accounting officer)”. 
151 s. Section 64 of the Act reads: “(1) If it at any time appears that any business of a corporation was or is 
being carried on recklessly, with gross negligence or with intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent 
purpose, a court may on the application of the Master, or any creditor, member or liquidator of the corporation, 
declare that any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in any such manner, shall 
be personally liable for all or any of such debts or other liabilities of the corporation as the court may direct, 
and the court may give such further orders as it considers proper for the purpose of giving effect to the 
declaration and enforcing that liability.” 
152 The High Court in  Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Limited v Ebrahim and Others 2008 (2) SA 303 (C) pierced 
the corporate veil on the bases of s65 of the Close Corporation Act thereby attaching liability to Embraim on the 
bases of reckless trading. This was the first time in our law the courts had applied section 65 of this Act to attach 
personal liability to shareholders of a close corporation.   
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Basfour 121 CC v M & R Interior Concepts and Others153 the Western Cape High Court 
followed the decision in Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Limited v Ebrahim and Others with 
approval. 
Larkin154 argues that, section 65 of the Close Corporations Act should be approached in a way 
which avoids any clumsiness or uncertainty. To achieve this, the power of a court to deem a 
close corporation not to exist in respect of certain rights, obligations or liabilities could be used 
as a power to see whether or not the corporation existed as a fact for those particular 
circumstances, for example whether or not the corporation's separate entity status was truly 
relevant to those rights, obligations or liabilities155. This would result in a sensitive, wide, 
statutory provision which, especially if interpreted widely in other respects as well, would be 
a very practical and effective statutory version of what company law has at common law156. 
SARS has never used this remedy however it remains available to it as a tool to attach personal 
liability to directors and shareholders of close corporations who operate their business 
recklessly or fraudulently. 
3.4. Piercing the Corporate Veil using the Tax Administration Act 29 of 2011 
Section 180 of the Tax Administration Act 157(hereinafter referred to as the TAA) has created 
a further avenue for SARS to piece the corporate veil. SARS can, under section 180 and section 
181 of the TAA hold the financial management and shareholders liable for the company’s tax 
debt to the extent that their negligence gave rise to the company failing to settle its tax debt. 
Section 180 state that,  
“A person is personally liable for any tax debt of the taxpayer to the extent 
that the person’s negligence or fraud resulted in the failure to pay the tax 
debt if: 
 (a) the person controls or is regularly involved in the management of the 
overall financial affairs of a taxpayer; an 
                                                          
153 [2015] ZAWCHC 44 
154 Note 15 above at 337 
155 ibid 
156 ibid 
157 Act 29 of 2011 
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 (b) a senior SARS official is satisfied that the person is or was negligent or 
fraudulent in respect of the payment of the tax debts of the taxpayer”.  
Section 181 goes on to state that  
“(1) This section applies where a company is wound up other than by means 
of an involuntary liquidation without having satisfied its tax debt, including 
its liability as a responsible third party, withholding agent, or a 
representative taxpayer, employer or vendor.  (2) The persons who are 
shareholders of the company within one year prior to its winding up are 
jointly and severally liable to pay the unpaid tax to the extent that.  
(a) They receive assets of the company in their capacity as shareholders 
within one year prior to its winding up; and  
(b) The tax debt existed at the time of the receipt of the assets or would have 
existed had the company complied with its obligations under a tax Act. 
 (3) The liability of the shareholders is secondary to the liability of the 
company.  
(4) Persons who are liable for tax of a company under this section may avail 
themselves of any rights against SARS as would have been available to the 
company. 
 (5) This section does not apply— (a) in respect of a “listed company” within 
the meaning of the Income Tax Act; or (b) in respect of a shareholder of a 
company referred to in paragraph (a)” 
 Further a public officer of the company may be held personally liable for the company’s tax 
debt if one of the requirements of section 155 of the TAA is met158. If the requirements of s 
155 of the TAA are not met then the public officer may not be held liable and SARS may only 
                                                          
158 Section 155 of the Tax Administration act state that,” Personal liability of representative taxpayer.—A 
representative taxpayer is personally liable for tax payable in the representative taxpayer’s representative 
capacity, if, while it remains unpaid— (a) the representative taxpayer alienates, charges or disposes of amounts 
in respect of which the tax is chargeable; or (b) the representative taxpayer disposes of or parts with funds or 
moneys, which are in the representative taxpayer’s possession or come to the representative taxpayer after the 
tax is payable, if the tax could legally have been paid from or out of the funds or moneys”. 
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recover the tax debt from the company’s assets in the possession, management or control of 
the public officer.  
In conclusion the TAA has further expanded the already wide discretion to pierce the corporate 
veil the courts have at statutory law. In that SARS can effectively hold any company employee 
liable for a tax debt as long as it can prove negligence or fraud. This position is a radical shift 
from the common law position that only shareholders and directors can be held personally 
liable for a company’s debts.  
3.5. Concluding remarks 
To sum it all up although, the above discussed legislation differs in the wording of the 
provisions which allow for the attachment of personal liability to directors and shareholders in 
cases of reckless, fraudulent trading and negligence trading, they are similar in that all of them 
are remedies which allow for creditors and other interested parties to statutorily pierce the 
corporate veil. 
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CHAPTER 4: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
COMMON LAW REMEDIES AND STATUTORY REMEDIES PROVIDED FOR BY 
THE COMPANIES ACTS 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter will critically analyse the relationship between the statutory remedies159 discussed 
in Chapter 3 above and the common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil and the actio 
pauliana. This will in an attempt to understand the following, Are the statutory remedies 
broader or narrower in scope than the common law remedies? What are the practical advantages 
and disadvantages of the different remedies? To what extend do the common law remedies 
influence statutory remedies provided by the various legislations dealt with above? To what 
extend are the common law remedies still relevant given that there is a plethora of statutory 
remedies available to litigants who want to pierce the corporate veil and attach personal liability 
to directors and shareholders. It will further explore the distinction between common law 
remedies and statutory remedies in an attempt to establish whether or not the common law 
remedies are still relevant to SARS. 
At first glance the statutory remedies discussed above seem to expand the application of the 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil by effectively widening the scope and reach of the 
doctrine. However statutory remedies are creatures of legislation in that their interpretation and 
application is limited to the wording of the specific legislation and the rules of statutory 
interpretation, while common law remedies like the actio pauliana and lifting the corporate 
veil are grounded in the principle of fairness and justice, which allows for greater flexibility on 
interpretation. This has allowed the common law to continually evolve with the change in 
times, beliefs and acceptable conduct from the principles laid down in the Corpus Uris Civils 
up to modern times. In general, common law remedies have proven to be more flexible through 
their ability to evolve through changing times. However, the case with piercing the corporate 
veil seems to be an exception to this generalisation. This will be discussed in greater detail 
below, through a comparison of the common law remedies discussed above with the statutory 
remedies provided in company law.  
4.2 Distinction between actio pauliana and the statutory remedies provided discussed in 
Chapter 3  
                                                          
159 Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984 
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The actio pauliana is fundamentally different from the statutory remedies160 discussed in 
Chapter 3 above. In that the actio pauliana, does not aim to pierce the corporate veil nor to 
disregard the separate legal personality of the company and its shareholders or directors, as in 
the case of the statutory piercing of the corporate veil. The main aim of the actio pauliana is to 
simply recover goods or property wherein a debtor has transferred property to a third party with 
the intent to defraud his creditors.  
This difference is further highlighted by the fact that the statutory remedies of piercing the 
corporate veil under both section 424 of the old Companies Act and section 20(9) of the new 
Companies Act are relatively new legal principles, which originate and the Salomon161 case. 
This is markedly different from the actio pauliana which can be traced back to the Roman 
times162. The actio pauliana was then adopted in later Roman-Dutch law, during this time its 
principles were systemised, however the general principles have remained the rules that 
evolved in Roman law that were subsequently codified in the Code of Justinian163.  
The actio pauliana is an action for the recovery of a thing alienated by a debtor in fraud of his 
creditors and that the action arises where the fraudulent alienation has been made with the 
knowledge of the person to whom the alienation has been made, that is to say, where the latter 
has shared in the fraud164. It will only apply where there is fraudulent disposition; alienation or 
transfer of asserts by debtor in an attempt to permanently deprive the creditors of any recourse 
at law by effectively reducing the debtor’s estate. Unlike the statutory remedies of piercing the 
corporate veil which were specifically designed to attach personal liability to directors and 
shareholders whose conduct amount to unconscionable abuse, fraud and reckless in the 
conducting company business.  
The actio pauliana is designed to avoid certain transactions that are to the detriment of creditors 
and was developed in tandem with execution (debt-collecting) procedures of property law,165 
essential elements for successfully invoking the actio pauliana against the recipient are that 
there was a fraudulent disposition of his property by a debtor; the disposition must have caused 
or increased the alienator’s insolvency; and the recipient must have participated in the fraud. If 
                                                          
160 Statutory piercing of the corporate veil using the S 20(9) of the new Companies Act, s424 of the old 
Companies Act, S 65 of the C.C Act and the Tax Administration Act 
161 Salomon v Salomon 1896 UKHL 1, [1897] AC 22  
162 Ibid  
163 Pothier Commentarius ad Pandectas ad D 42.8; Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas ad D 42.8 containing the             
Paulian provisions of the 17th century Roman-Dutch Law. 
164 Boraine A, “Towards Codifying The Actio Pauliana” (1996) 8 S. Afr. MerL.J. 213    
165 Ibid 
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the property was obtained by a lucrative title (for example, a donation), the fraudulent intention 
of the debtor would suffice166. On the other hand, the statutory piercing of the corporate veil 
remedies are based on the powers of the court to disregard the separate legal personality of the 
company and the imposition of liability on the controllers for their conduct in entering 
transactions as representatives or the moving forces behind the companies on the basis of 
fraudulent, reckless or negligent trading by the directors or shareholders.  
The statutory piercing of the corporate veil as discussed in chapter 3 above provide for much 
broader in application. This broad application is exquisitely summed up by the use the phrase 
was there in “unconscionable abuse” and “gross abuse” in the new Companies Act and Close 
Corporations Act respectively. This is unlike the actio pauliana which only apply to fraudulent 
conveying or transfers. 
The second requirement that need to be satisfied for the actio pauliana to apply is that the 
recipient must have participated in the fraud. Meaning that the recipient of the property must 
have known that the transfer was fraudulent and willing took part. This is different from the 
statutory remedy of piercing the corporate veil in that they do not impose any such onus on a 
person initiating the action to prove that the recipient or beneficiary of a fraudulent transaction 
should have known or anticipated the fraud in order to be successful with the action.  
For the actio pauliana to find application it requires that the fraudulent transfer must have 
caused the loss suffered by the creditors.  This is very different from statutory piercing of the 
corporate veil in that there is the no such requirement that creditors have to prove a causal 
nexus between the actions of the debtor and their loss. From this statutory piercing of the 
corporate veil has a wide and more flexible latitude of application as creditors are not restricted 
by the requirement that they have to prove the fraudulent transfer caused the loss suffered to 
them. 
At common law, South African courts had a restrictive attitude towards the issue of establishing 
locus standi167.In United Watch and Diamond (Pty) Ltd v Disa Hotels Ltd168  where the court outlined 
the test for determining this right or legal capacity, stating that “to establish that one has locus standi 
in judicio, one must show,... that he has an interest in the subject matter of the judgment or 
                                                          
166 Ibid   
167 The principle of locus standi in judicio essentially relates to the right or legal capacity of a party to sue or be 
sued 
168 1972 (4) SA 409 (C)  
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order sufficiently direct or substantial....”169  In Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister 
of Labour170  it was elucidated that: 
'If a party has a direct and substantial interest in the order the court might make 
in proceedings, or if such order cannot be sustained or carried into effect 
without prejudicing that party he is a necessary party and should be joined in 
the proceedings"171  
It is generally required under the common law that litigants have to comply with the two 
requirements for locus standi, namely, the necessary capacity to sue and a demonstrable legal 
interest in the matter at issue172.  In TJ Jonck CC h/a Bothaville Vlesimark v Du Plessis, in 
relation to the term interest ‘, it was held that the term interest ‘should not be interpreted 
restrictively, it also shouldn‘t be too wide to include an indirect interest173. In Cabinet of the 
Transitional Government for the Territory of South West Africa v Eins174 it was held that an 
applicant must have a direct interest in the matter175.The standing of any person to seek a 
remedy in terms of the provision should be determined on the basis of well-established 
principle set out in Jacobs en ‘n Ander v Waks en Andere176 which states that: -  
“On who in general, the requirement of locus standi means that someone 
claiming legal aid must have an adequate interest in the subject of the 
proceedings to allow the Court to judge that his claim should be 
considered. It is not a technical concept with fixed boundaries. The most 
common way of describing the requirement is to say that a claimant or 
applicant must have direct interest in the requested legal aid (it should not 
be removed too far); otherwise, it is also said, according to the coherence of 
the facts, that there must be a real interest (not abstract or academic)”  
This is true for the actio pauliana which affords locus standi only to creditors who will have 
been prejudiced by a fraudulent dispossession of asserts of a debtor. This is unlike the company 
law statutory remedies discussed above which affords locus standi to a wide group of interested 
                                                          
169 Ibid at at 415A 
170 1949 (3) SA 631 at 637 
171 Bunton and Another v Coetzee and Another  [2014] ZAGPPHC 553 
172 Loots in Woolman (2009) (1) 7-2. 
173 TJ Jonck CC h/a Bothaville Vlesimark v Du Plessis 1998(1) SA 971 (O) 9 
174  1988 (3) SA 369 (A) at page 388 
175 Ibid.   
176 1992 (1) SA 521 (A), at 533J-534E   
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parties from other shareholders to debtors. The actio pauliana expressly state that only 
creditors can initiate the process against fraudulent debtors, this means that shareholders can 
not directly initiate any action for the recovery of assets of a fraudulent dispossession in their 
unlike under the statutory piercing the corporate veil. This is because of the use of the phrase 
“interested person” as used in all the statutes discussed above. 
In Ex parte Gore the court stated that 
 “the phrase should not be interpreted too restrictively, but at the same time it 
should not be interpreted too widely as to include an indirect interest. This 
interest is limited to a financial or monetary interest.”177 
 In Gore the court simply approved of and adopted the general principles stated in Jacobs en 'n 
Ander v Waks en Andere 178 is questionable whether it was the intention of Gore to extend the 
scope of section 20(9) of the Companies Act much more widely than that of section 65 of the 
Close Corporations Act, where a financial or monetary interest is a requirement179.  
The scope of the application of the phrase interested person unequivocally extends the provides 
for a wide categories of persons who can initiate an action for statutory piercing of the corporate 
veil, this is unlike the actio pauliana which is restricted by principle and can only be initiated 
by creditors in the strict sense of its meaning. 
4.3 Distinction between the common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil and   
statutory piercing of the corporate veil. 
The common law notion of piercing the corporate veil and the statutory provisions providing 
for same in the various Acts under discussion in this dissertation are marked similar. This is 
because the statutory provisions are an attempt to partially codify and synthesise the common 
law position with regards to piercing the corporate veil. The common law notion of piercing 
the corporate veil is applied to protect the interests of a company’s creditors. In many instances 
this proviso also aims to combat fraud, which is in the public interest.180 This is the same for 
S20 (9) of the new Companies Act and all other statutory provisions which allow for piercing 
of the corporate veil. The main aim of both common law and statutory piercing of the corporate 
                                                          
177 Ex parte Gore at para 27 
178 Ibid  
179 Cassim R  Piercing the corporate veil a new direction (2014) 26 SA MERC LJ at page 316 
180 Nicolene Schoeman De Rebus in 2012 (June) DR 10. http://www.derebus.org.za/piercing-corporate-veil-
new-companies-act/ accessed on 10/10/2017 at 1046 am  
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veil is to avoid the abuse of separate legal personality between a company and its shareholders 
or directors. Both remedies act as a method of attaching liability to the perpetrators or abusers. 
It must be noted that another similarity between the common law remedy of piercing the 
corporate veil and its statutory cousin with particular reference to section 20(9) of the new 
Companies Act and section 65 of the Close Corporation Act is that both these remedies have 
failed to authoritatively define or to ascertain when the corporate veil can be pierced. The 
statutory provisions which allow for piercing the corporate veil use phrases like 
“unconscionable abuse and gross abuse” respectively. Just like at common law the two phrases 
do not list or try to set out principles where the corporate veil must be pierced. Further just like 
at common law the Courts have failed to interpret the sections to ascertain the principles 
wherein the corporate veil maybe pierced. 
The common law version of piercing the corporate veil is however distinct from the statutory 
piercing particularly section 20 (9) of the new Companies Act in a number of ways. Firstly, at 
common law when the corporate veil is pierced both the company and its shareholders or 
directors remain liable for the principle debt. In essence at common law the courts in cases of 
abuse of juristic personality will look to attach personal liability on the directors or shareholders 
while at the same time not exonerating the company from its obligations. The debt is therefore 
imputed onto the shareholders or directors, by virtue of the piercing of the corporate veil in that 
they are jointly and severally liable for the liabilities that will be in question.  
However, section 20 (9) of the new Companies Act raises an interesting question in that it states 
that the company will be “deemed not to be a juristic person”181. This can be interpreted to 
mean that when piercing the corporate veil under the new Companies Act the company by 
implication is unconditionally and absolutely exonerated 182 from the debt and the creditors in 
this case SARS by implication will only have a recourse against the shareholders or directors. 
It remains to be seen on how our Courts will interpret this section. It is likely that the courts 
interpret the wording “deemed not to be a juristic person” without attaching any special 
significance to it as was illustrated in Ex parte Gore therefore incorporating the common law 
position into the interpretation of statutory piercing effectively attaching liability joint and 
severally to both the company and its directors or shareholders.  
                                                          
181 The Close Corporation Act uses the same phrase. 
182 Williams RC Concise Corporate Law 2nd ed (2013) at page 107. 
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At common law, there is a plethora of case law and academic writing which concludes that it 
is far from settled on when the corporate veil will be pierced.183It is on the discretion of the 
court to pierce the corporate through a balancing act of the policies behind the recognition of a 
separate corporate existence and against the policies justifying piercing.184 This means that at 
common law piercing the corporate veil will be pierced when it objectively established from 
the facts on a case by case bases if there has been abuse of juristic personality.  
This is unlike statutory piercing under the new Companies Act which expressly state that the 
prerequisite for statutory piercing of the corporate veil is “unconscionable abuse” of juristic 
personality.185In Ex parte Gore the phrase interpreted to mean  
“these words postulate conduct in relation to the formation and use of 
companies that is diverse enough to cover all the descriptive terms such as 
‘sham’, ‘device’, ‘stratagem’, and ‘conceivably much more”. 
 In this the court interpreted the section to be much more flexible, wide and set a low threshold 
to prove the requirement than at common law piercing of the corporate veil. It literally means 
that the court will pierce the corporate veil when it subjectively views it necessary, this low 
threshold set out in Ex Parte Gore may lead to abuse and a floodgate of litigation in piercing 
the corporate veil cases. This very different from the common law position that set out in Cape 
Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Ply) Ltd186  and in Hülse-Reutter and Others v 
Gödde187 where the Supreme Court of Appeal has categorically stated that the courts will not 
easily pierce the corporate, as the doctrine of separate of legal personality is sacrosanct188. In 
principle under section 20 (9) of the new Companies Act has now made it much easier for 
litigants such as SARS to initiate an action for piercing the corporate veil that at common law. 
                                                          
183 See Chapter 2.1.2 at page 14 
184 Note 71 above  
185 The Close Corporation Act uses the phrase gross abuse of juristic personality, while the 1973 Companies Act 
and the Tax Administration Act concentrates of reckless and fraudulent trading. Gross abuse of juristic 
personality has been interpreted in Ex parte Gore to be similar to “unconscionable abuse”.  
186 The court in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty)Ltd emphasised, “if the separate legal 
personality of a company is too lightly disregarded by courts, this would negate and undermine the 
policy and principles that underpin the concept of separate corporate personality and the legal consequences that 
attach thereto”. 
187 Ibid 
188  Note 194 above 
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Further at common law the remedy of the piercing the corporate veil is evoked only as a remedy 
of last resort.189 This is unlike the position under statutory piercing as provided for in the new 
Companies Act, as In Ex parte Gore the court expressly stated that section 20 (9) is not a 
remedy of last resort .The court remarked that the unqualified availability of the remedy under 
section 20(9) militates against an approach that the remedy should be granted only in the 
absence of any alternative remedy190. The court went on to state that: 
“The newly introduced statutory provision affords a firm, albeit very flexibly 
defined, basis for the remedy, which will inevitably operate, I think, to erode 
the foundation of the philosophy that piercing the corporate veil should be 
approached with an à priori diffidence. By expressly establishing its 
availability simply when the facts of a case justify it, the provision detracts 
from the notion that the remedy should be regarded as exceptional, or 
‘‘drastic’’191. 
The position adopted by the court in the interpretation of section 20 (9) of the new Companies 
Act is the in contradiction to the common law position in Hülse-Reutter v Gödde by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal. The position adopted by the court in Ex parte Gore implies that an 
aggrieved party in this case SARS raises the remedy of piercing the corporate veil under 
common law, the courts will have to treat it as a remedy of last resort. However, if it raises the 
same remedy under the new Companies Act it would be treated as an ordinary remedy. In 
principle the common law remedy and statutory remedies of piercing the corporate veil are 
slowly evolving into two distinct remedies. 
Regardless of these differences it very difficult to try and imagine a situation wherein common 
law piercing the corporate veil will apply to the exclusion of statutory piercing of the corporate 
veil under the various company law statutes discussed above in particular to the exclusion of 
section 20 (9) of the new Companies Act. However, the opposite is true as there are now 
situations where the court will not pierce the corporate veil under common law but will gladly 
do so under section 20(9) of the new Companies Act for example where a creditor has another 
remedy available to them. 
                                                          
189 In Hülse-Reutter v Gödde, the Supreme Court of Appeal adopted a stricter approach in this respect and 
stated: “The very exceptional nature of the relief which the respondent seeks against the appellants requires, in 
the circumstances of the present case, that he should have no other remedy” 
190 Ex parte Gore at para 34 
191 ibid 
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4.4   Relevance of common law remedies to SARS 
4.4.1. Relevance of Actio Pauliana  
The actio pauliana is still relevant to SARS as an alternative to section 424 of the 1973 
Companies Act to piercing the corporate veil in cases of insolvency. This is because the actio 
pauliana although it is now a remedy of general application in fraudulent transfers, it is 
fundamentally an insolvency remedy and it finds application in scenarios wherein SARS will 
be trying to recover debts from companies going which fraudulently alienate there asserts 
before after sequestration to avoid the consequences of insolvency. The actio pauliana is 
grounded in principle hence it is not limited by the wording as in the case of statutes hence 
offers a wide and more comprehensive remedy when dealing with fraudulent alienations. It 
will be most effective when used in pleadings in the alternative to section 424 of the 1973 
Companies Act. SARS has however used this remedy sparingly over the years, hopefully it 
will find more application in the future as it is a very powerful remedy. 
4.4.2. Relevance of Common law piercing the Corporate Veil to SARS. 
Piercing the corporate veil at common law remains relevant as it forms the core of the doctrine 
of piercing the corporate veil to which courts refer and try to find answers when interpreting 
the various statutes which allow for piercing of the corporate veil. Statutes only create a 
framework for courts to work from, and do not define key phrases to the applications of their 
provisions192, for example in section 20 (9) of the new Companies Act does not define the 
phrase “unconscionable abuse” and the courts had to do a look to common law piercing of the 
corporate veil to get to the meaning of the phrase. 
The new Companies Act section 20 (9) does not contain any excludes the application of the 
common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.  Section 20 (9) simply acts as a supplement 
the common law position and it plays a central part in widening the application of the doctrine 
of piercing the corporate veil by removing the stringent restrictions associated with the 
application of common law doctrines. In Ex parte Gore the court went on to state that “Having 
regard to the established predisposition against categorisation in this area of the law and the 
elusiveness of a convincing definition of the pertinent common law principles, it seems that it 
                                                          
192 Section 424 of the 1973 Act does not define the meaning of reckless and negligent trading it leaves it to the 
courts to give a definition to same. I Section 65 of The Close Corporation Act  does not define the meaning of 
gross abuse of a juristic personality  
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would be appropriate to regard s 20(9) of the Companies Act as supplemental to the common 
law, rather than substitutive193” 
In practise given the introduction of the highly flexible statutory piercing the corporate veil 
under the new Companies Act, which is easier to institute and prove and which is not bound 
by common law restrictive application principles as in the case of its common law cousin, 
institutions such as SARS will prefer the statutory route when piercing the corporate veil. This 
is because it is simpler and less stringent and to some extend easier to ascertain than the case 
of common law piercing of the corporate veil institutions such as SARS requires an expedient 
settlement of its cases in order to maximise revenue collection hence statutory piercing of the 
corporate veil under section 20 (9) of the new Companies Act provides such an avenue .An 
advantage of the new statutory provision on piercing the corporate veil is that it gives more 
certainty and visibility to the doctrine of piercing the veil, but a danger is that it may result in 
the doctrine becoming inflexible, particularly if the courts interpret the provision in a technical 
way.194  
The cumulative effect of the various statutes discussed above that allow for statutory   piercing 
of the corporate available to SARS point in a direction where piercing of the corporate veil at 
common will be used less and less significant.  Given that piercing the corporate veil at 
common law is more stringent and the courts will not easily grant it means that SARS in tax 
cases depending on the facts and circumstances will rely on section 20 (9) of the new 
Companies Act, section 424 of the 1973 Companies Act, section 65 of the Close Corporation 
Act and the Tax Administration Act to pierce the corporate veil as it is simpler and much easier 
than at common law. 
 
  
                                                          
193 Ex parte Gore at para 34 
194 (FHI Cassim, MF Cassim, R Cassim, R Jooste, J Shev and J Yeats Contemporary Company law 2012 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 5.1 Overview   
The aim of this research was to establish whether or not the common law remedy of piercing 
the corporate veil and the actio pauliana are different from the statutory remedies under 
company law that allow for piercing of the corporate veil. It was also aimed at establishing 
whether or not these common law remedies are still relevant. 
Section 20 (9) of the new Companies Act has introduced a statutory version the remedy of 
piercing the corporate veil, however it is not the only statute under company law which allows 
for piercing of the corporate veil as section 424 of the old Companies Act is still in force with 
regards to reckless and fraudulent trading in insolvency, section 64 and 65 of the Close 
Corporation Act provide for same and lastly the corporate veil can also be pierced under section 
180 of the Tax Administration Act. These statutory remedies without doubt are fundamentally 
different to the actio pauliana in terms of the scope of their application and flexibility. This is 
because in principle the actio pauliana does not provide for piercing of the corporate veil but 
only for recovery of assets form fraudulent dispossessions. 
The remedy of piercing the corporate veil at common law is very similar to its statutory cousin 
in that at present both doctrines are open ended and do not prescribe with certainty when the 
corporate veil should be pierced and in that both fail to establish a single coherent ascertainable 
set of principles in the application of this doctrine. This is despite a lot of litigation around this 
area of law. 
There are however some significant differences between piercing the corporate veil at common 
law and its statutory cousin. Firstly the interpretation of the Court in Ex parte Gore where it 
stated that under section 20(9) of the new Companies Act piercing the corporate veil is no 
longer a remedy of last resort has expanded and the application of this to statutory remedy to 
be wider and more comprehensive that its common law cousin which is restricted by the 
decision in Hülse-Reutter v Gödde which expressly state that piercing the corporate veil is a 
drastic remedy which must be used only as a remedy of last resort.  
Further section 20 (9) seemingly unconditionally and absolutely exonerate the company from 
liability when piercing the corporate veil while at common law when piercing the corporate 
veil, the directors and shareholders are held joint and severally liable for the debt together with 
the company.  
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From the above discussion the common law remedy of piercing the corporate veil and its 
statutory cousin are evolving to become two distinct remedies, as the requirements one is 
required to satisfy in order for them to apply are now different. Further the burden of prove and 
discretion of the Court to pierce the corporate veil under section 20 (9) of the new Companies 
Act has become much lower than at common law signifying this divergence of the two into 
very distinct remedies. It remains to be seen how the courts will deal with the issue in future 
litigation. 
  In conclusion the common law remedies of piercing the corporate veil and the actio pauliana 
are still very relevant to SARS as tools of attaching personal liability to directors and 
shareholders who abuse the doctrine of separate juristic personality. These common law 
remedies have managed to evolve with the changing company law trends to remain very effect 
remedies. However due the plethora of statutory remedies which allow for piercing of the 
corporate veil which are less stringent to satisfy these common law remedies will became less 
and less significant to SARS.    
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